receive from their monitoring activities are more likely to exceed the costs of monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988) . 2 Evidence consistent with this argument has been reported in several studies. For example, Mandelker (1990, 1992 ) document a positive overall relation between stock price reactions to proposals of antitakeover charter amendments (antitakeover amendments) and the aggregate percentage of the firm's equity held by outside blockholders. Denis and Serano (1996) report evidence suggesting that the outside blockholders are instrumental in removing poorly performing managers following failed takeover bids.
Although blockholders can, on average, have greater incentives to monitor managers than small stockholders, the incentives of all blockholders are not necessarily the same. Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) explore differences in the monitoring incentives of outside blockholders that have current or potential business ties to the firm (affiliated blockholders) and outside blockholders that do not have such ties (unaffiliated blockholders) by examining blockholder votes on antitakeover amendment proposals. 3 They find that affiliated blockholders, which they define as including banks, insurance companies, and non-bank trusts, are more likely to vote with management than unaffiliated blockholders. Further, Brickley, Lease, and Smith examine differences in voting patterns for antitakeover amendments associated with positive stock price reactions and those associated with negative stock price reactions. Interestingly, they find unaffiliated blockholders are no more likely to oppose antitakeover amendments than affiliated blockholders when the stock price reaction to the proposal is negative.
Bethel, Liebeskind, and Opler (1998) also report evidence of variation in blockholder 2 The relaxation of proxy rules pertaining to stockholder communications in 1992 made it easier for stockholders to share monitoring costs through the use of coalitions. While this improved the cost/benefit trade-off for small stockholders, communication costs are still likely to make it more costly for them to monitor management. Before 1992, written materials regarding communications between more than ten stockholders had to be provided to all stockholders. Since then, any number of communicating stockholders has only been required to file written materials with the SEC (Smith, 1996) . 3 Brickley, Lease, and Smith use the term 'pressure-sensitive' to describe institutions that may be especially sensitive to pressure from management to vote with it. Similarly, they use the term 'pressure-resistant' to describe institutions that are less sensitive to such pressure. We use the terms 'affiliated' and 'unaffiliated', respectively, to refer to these two types of institutions.
incentives. They examine changes at firms following the acquisition of blocks by activist and nonactivist investors and find that acquisitions by activist investors are followed by increases in asset divestitures and industry-adjusted operating profitability, decreases in mergers and acquisitions, and abnormal stock price appreciation.
We add to the evidence on the effectiveness of monitoring by blockholders. Specifically, we examine the relations between affiliated and unaffiliated outside (non-insider) blockholdings and the stock price reaction to antitakeover amendment announcements for evidence on stockholder perceptions concerning variation in the monitoring incentives of outside blockholders. We define affiliated outside blockholders to include commercial and investment banks, insurance companies, and employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). Unaffiliated outside blockholders include non-financial firms, asset management companies, and individuals who are neither managers of the firm nor related to managers.
The evidence we report is strongly consistent with the idea that affiliated and unaffiliated blockholders have different incentives to monitor management. The overall relation between abnormal stock returns around the proposal of supermajority, fair price, classified board, and blank check preferred stock amendments (hereafter referred to collectively as antitakeover amendments) and the percentage of outside blockholdings is positive, but insignificant. However, this relation is negative and significant for affiliated blockholders, primarily for commercial and investment banks. Moreover, the difference between the affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings is also significantly negatively related to the abnormal return. In addition, commercial and investment bank and insurance company blockholders are found to be more prevalent in firms with negative abnormal returns than in firms with positive abnormal returns.
Overall, the evidence suggests that negative abnormal returns are more likely at firms in which affiliated blockholders have larger ownership interests than unaffiliated blockholders. The difference in the stock ownership of these two classes of blockholders explains more of the variation in abnormal returns than factors such as management stock ownership and board composition. The evidence is robust to the inclusion of controls for the number of antitakeover amendments proposed, firm performance, firm growth opportunities, chief executive officer (CEO) equity holdings, insider blockholdings, board composition, and firm size.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses blockholder incentives and how a study of antitakeover amendment proposals allows us to obtain evidence on them. Section II describes the data and Section III discusses factors that have been found to be related to stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment proposals. Evidence on variation in outside blockholder monitoring incentives is presented in Section IV and conclusions are summarized in Section V.
I. Blockholder Incentives and Antitakeover Amendments

A. Blockholder Incentives
The arguments by Shleifer and Vishny (1988) focus only on the incentives associated with stock ownership. They assume that monitoring is provided by stockholders who bear all of the costs and realize all of the benefits associated with their monitoring activities. These arguments do not consider situations in which large stockholders do not bear the full costs of bad decisions that their proportionate ownership in the firm would suggest. Some investors, who are considered large stockholders by the SEC, exercise only the voting rights for shares on which other investors hold the residual claims.
Commercial banks are an example of a class of stockholder that does not fit neatly into the model described by Shleifer and Vishny. The incentives that commercial banks have to monitor managers differ considerably from those of other stockholders. Since 1933, banks have been prohibited from owning stock on their own account, and are only allowed to manage shares held in trust accounts and in corporate pension plans. Banks generally pool these shares for reporting purposes (Del Guercio, 1996) and often have voting rights for shares held in trusts.
As Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) suggest, the incentives that banks have to cultivate business relationships with the firms in which they hold shares in trust present the potential for conflicts of interest. By law, banks must keep their trust activities separate from their other activities. Firewalls are put in place so that bank trust departments are not influenced by other departments. These firewalls are intended to ensure that trusts are managed in the interest of their beneficiaries. If the firewalls are breached, a bank might have an incentive to vote those shares held in trusts in support of management decisions, even when these decisions are not in the best interests of stockholders. Even within a trust department, the threat of losing substantial trust business can provide an incentive to vote with management.
The benefits of voting with management can accrue to the bank through increased business with the firm whereas any decline in the value of the shares is largely borne by the trust and pension beneficiaries. Therefore, banks can have greater incentives to support management than other blockholders, even those that have substantial business with the firm. Banks do not bear the costs of supporting poor decisions when they are voting shares held in trust. While the practice of separating trust operations from other operations in commercial banks and their affiliated companies might suggest that the potential for conflicts of interest is not great, the importance of these conflicts is ultimately an empirical question.
Like banks, ESOP trustees also have incentives to vote shares in support of management.
Because ESOP trustees are selected by management, and do not bear the full costs associated with decisions that decrease stockholder value, they have incentives to vote with management to the extent that they could lose their positions by not doing so.
Investment banks and insurance companies do not have as strong an incentive to support management as commercial banks and ESOPs because they bear the costs of supporting managers who make decisions that reduce stockholder value. On the other hand, protecting their current or potential lines of business can provide an incentive to support poor managers. Although they suffer the full costs associated with declines in the value of shares they hold, investment banks and insurance companies have the potential for even greater losses, in terms of cancelled business or lost business opportunities with the firm, if they oppose managers.
In contrast to commercial and investment banks, ESOPs, and insurance companies, the principal interests of other blockholders, such as non-financial corporations, asset management companies, and individuals, are likely to be more focused on the performance of the firm's stock.
Unlike affiliated blockholders, these three investor groups tend to have greater incentives to effectively monitor management on behalf of stockholders and to vote in favor of only those proposals that maximize the value of their equity holdings in the firm. Although non-financial firms can be affiliated as customers or suppliers, we believe the majority are unlikely to be as sensitive to pressure from the CEO as those classes of investors we designate as affiliated. Consequently, consistent with the classification scheme employed by Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) , we designate non-financial firms as unaffiliated.
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B. Antitakeover Amendments
Because antitakeover amendments have a variety of uses, the adoption of an antitakeover amendment is a natural event for a study of stockholder perceptions of the monitoring incentives of outside blockholders. These amendments can benefit stockholders at some firms, while benefiting managers at the expense of stockholders at other firms. Stulz (1988) proposes that two effects occur simultaneously when an antitakeover amendment is adopted. The expected premium in the event of a takeover increases while the probability of a takeover decreases. 5 An increase in the expected premium enables stockholders to realize a greater proportion of the total gains from a takeover. There is empirical evidence consistent with this idea. Comment and Schwert (1995) find that control share laws, the state-legislated equivalent of an antitakeover amendment, result in higher takeover premiums.
There is also evidence supporting the idea that antitakeover amendments reduce the probability of a takeover, thereby facilitating managerial entrenchment. Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) find that the managers of firms proposing antitakeover amendments are over-compensated, on average, 7 and that firms with antitakeover amendments are less likely to receive takeover bids. This evidence is consistent with the idea that amendment proposals are motivated, at least in part, by efforts on the part of managers to protect above-market compensation.
An antitakeover amendment can also benefit stockholders by facilitating optimal long-term contracting between stockholders and managers. Knoeber (1986) posits that actions that reduce the likelihood of a hostile takeover can induce managers to enter into long-term deferred compensation contracts that are beneficial to stockholders because they reduce the likelihood of opportunistic behavior against the manager. Stein (1988) suggests that antitakeover amendments can provide managers with incentives to invest in positive NPV projects that are likely to initially appear unprofitable to the capital markets. The protection provided by antitakeover amendments reduces the likelihood that the manager will be replaced through a takeover before the real value of such projects is revealed to the market.
The ultimate effect that the adoption of an antitakeover amendment has on the stock price of a firm depends on the relative wealth impacts of the above effects. For example, if the motivation behind the adoption of all antitakeover amendments is entrenchment, the decreased probability of a takeover should dominate and the overall wealth effect should be negative. However, the evidence on the wealth effects associated with antitakeover amendment proposals is mixed. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and Bhagat and Jefferies (1991) report that antitakeover amendment proposals are, on average, associated with an insignificant negative stock price reaction, Linn and McConnell (1983) and McWilliams (1990) report a positive average stock price reaction, whereas DeAngelo and Rice (1983) find no meaningful wealth effect.
Although this evidence is sometimes interpreted as showing that antitakeover amendments are not economically significant and therefore of little importance, this interpretation is not consistent with the evidence presented in Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997) . The mixed evidence from studies of wealth effects can reflect considerable cross-sectional variation in the motivations underlying antitakeover amendment adoptions. Other factors, such as the quality of monitoring by blockholders, might contribute to the market's perception of the motivation underlying amendment adoptions and result in variation in the measured wealth effects across different samples used in different studies.
This study focuses on the announcement of supermajority, fair price, classified board, and blank check preferred stock provisions. Adoption of any of these provisions can signal the decision by a firm to make tender offers more costly for bidders. 6 Supermajority antitakeover amendments require approval of a supermajority of the firm's stockholders (typically between 66 percent and 80 percent) before a merger can be completed whereas fair price antitakeover amendments require either supermajority stockholder approval or that the bidding firm pays a "fair price" to all the tendering stockholders. A fair price is typically defined as the highest price paid to any one of the tendering stockholders. Classified board amendments stipulate that no more than one-third of the board of directors can be elected in a given year. This can make it more difficult and time consuming to take control of the board. Finally, blank check preferred stock allows the board to issue preferred stock to parties friendly to the board. This provision can be used to prevent an unwelcome bidder from obtaining majority control of a firm by simply offering a premium for the firm's common shares when the preferred shares can be issued with voting rights. Thus, a blank check preferred stock provision can encourage a bidder to negotiate directly with the company's board for control of the firm.
Whereas supermajority and fair price amendments are useful only in the event of a takeover bid, classified board and blank check preferred stock amendments can have other uses. For instance, classified board amendments help ensure the continuity of decision making within a firm. Blank check preferred stock amendments provide the firm with flexibility in financing decisions.
II. Data
We report evidence from a sample of 294 firm-year observations in which at least one antitakeover amendment is proposed in a firm's proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. To construct this sample, we began with the sample used by Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997 The median firm in our sample proposes two antitakeover provisions. Fair price amendments are proposed most frequently (229 observations,) followed by classified board (197 observations), blank check preferred stock (175 observations), and supermajority amendments (95 observations).
Twenty-three of the firms in our sample propose antitakeover amendments in two separate years. One firm proposes antitakeover amendments in three separate years.
To obtain industry and size adjusted measures of firm performance and growth opportunities, each amendment-adopting firm for which size information is available was matched to a firm in the Compustat database with the same four-digit SIC code that is closest in size at the time of the amendment proposal(s). Size is measured by the book value of total assets for the year prior to the year in which the antitakeover amendment is proposed. 7 We used Rosenbaum (2002) to identify whether the control firm proposed any antitakeover amendments in the years up to and including the year that the matched sample firm proposed an amendment. If the control firm proposed an antitakeover amendment during this period, it was eliminated and the matching procedure was repeated with the firm from the same four-digit SIC industry that is next closest in size.
Proxy statements for each firm were also used to identify outside blockholders and to obtain information on stock ownership and board composition. Blockholders are defined as stockholders who control at least 5 percent of a firm's voting shares. We define commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies, and ESOPs that control 5 percent of the firms' shares as affiliated blockholders and all other blockholders as unaffiliated. We classify directors who are employees or a relative of an employee of the firm as inside directors. Non-employee directors who are a former manager or the relative of a former manager, or who are currently employed at an accounting firm, a law firm, a consulting firm, an insurance company, a commercial bank, or an investment bank are classified as affiliated outside directors. We designate all other directors as independent outside directors.
III. Other Factors that Affect Stock Price Reactions to Antitakeover Amendment Proposals
As previously discussed, the evidence from studies that examine stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment announcements is mixed. This mixed evidence is consistent with the notion that firms propose antitakeover amendments for different reasons and that the market's reaction to an antitakeover amendment proposal depends on stockholder perceptions of the motives of the managers who propose the amendments. The market is more likely to view an antitakeover amendment proposal favorably if the incentives of managers appear to be aligned with those of the stockholders.
This section describes several factors, all influencing managerial incentives, which are likely to be associated with stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment adoptions. We control for these factors in the regressions reported in Table 5 to isolate the impact of blockholdings on the wealth effects of antitakeover amendment proposals.
A. Firm Performance and Growth Opportunities
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) suggest that stockholders are more likely to support an antitakeover amendment when it is proposed by a management team of proven quality. This effect likely to be stronger at firms that have greater growth opportunities because high growth option firms can benefit more from the ability of antitakeover amendments to facilitate efficient long-term contracting along the lines discussed by Knoeber (1986) and Stein (1988) . This implies that stock price reactions to antitakeover amendments are related to measures of firm performance and growth opportunities.
McWilliams (1993) examines the relation between the stock price reaction to antitakeover amendment proposals and firm growth opportunities, as proxied by Tobin's q, but finds no evidence of a significant relation between firm growth opportunities and shareholder perceptions of antitakeover amendments.
B. Insider Equity Holdings
Jensen and Meckling (1976) propose that management and stockholder interests become more aligned as the proportion of the firm's equity held by management increases. However, Stulz (1988) suggests that this relation may not be linear. He notes that an antitakeover amendment can substitute for increased insider equity holdings in providing target management with greater bargaining power when faced with a takeover bid. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) , Mandelker (1990), and McWilliams (1990) examine the relation between insider equity holdings and the stock price reaction to antitakeover amendment proposals. Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) report an insignificant negative relation, but Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) find that the relation is significant and positive. McWilliams (1990) finds the overall relation is negative, but, consistent with Stulz (1988) , finds a positive relation when insider equity holdings are less than 15 percent to 20 percent. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors have greater incentives to make decisions that benefit stockholders than inside directors. They maintain that the decisions made by outside directors signal the labor market concerning their abilities as decision control agents. Because most outside directors are major decision makers at other organizations, concern for their reputations in the labor market provides them with incentives to act in stockholder interests. As previously mentioned, evidence consistent with this argument has been reported elsewhere.
C. Composition of the Board of Directors
IV. Empirical Evidence
This section describes evidence on the relations between stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment proposals and the percentage of voting stock held by affiliated and unaffiliated outside blockholders. The methods used to examine these relations parallels those used in the literature that investigates the perceived influence of outside directors in major corporate decisions (Byrd and Hickman, 1992; Lee, Rosenstein, Rangan, and Davidson, 1992; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; McWilliams and Sen, 1997; and Perry, 2000) .
Our expectations regarding evidence on the motivations of affiliated and unaffiliated blockholders are consistent with those for inside or affiliated outside directors and for independent outside directors, respectively, in the board composition literature. In a study of the relation between board composition and stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment adoptions, McWilliams and Sen (1997) find that stock price reactions are more negative at firms where the board is dominated by inside and affiliated outside directors than where it is not. Like inside and affiliated outside directors, affiliated blockholders are both likely to have strong incentives to side with the CEO in decisions that are not necessarily in the best interests of stockholders.
A. Sample Descriptive Statistics
In Table 1 , we report summary statistics on firm size, performance, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and board composition for our sample. Panel A shows that the mean (median) book value of assets at sample firms is $2,627 ($561) million as of the end of the year preceding the amendment proposal. During the year before the proposal, the typical firm exhibits stronger operating performance, as measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to book assets, than either the average firm in the industry or its respective control firm. The ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets for the typical firm is also slightly greater than that of its control firm at the time of the proposal, indicating that the sample firms have somewhat higher growth opportunities.
Panel B of Table 1 shows that in 160 of the 294 sample observations, the firm has an outside blockholder, with the mean (median) outside blockholdings among all firms equal to 8. In Panel B of Table 1 , we also report statistics on equity holdings for the CEOs at the amendment-proposing firms. For simplicity, the executive with the highest cash compensation in the fiscal year preceding the amendment proposal is referred to as CEO, although this individual does not actually hold the CEO title in several cases. The mean and median percentages of CEO equity holdings, 5.21 percent and 0.73 percent, respectively, are well below the 15 percent to 20 percent level identified by McWilliams (1990) as the threshold in which the dominant impact of the antitakeover amendment shifts from takeover premium enhancement to takeover deterrence.
The mean and median percentages of independent outside directors at the amendmentproposing firms are 50.58 percent and 50.00 percent, respectively. These values are similar to those reported in studies of corporate boards (see for instance, Weisbach, 1988; and Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996) .
B. Univariate Tests of the Relation between Abnormal Stock Returns and Blockholdings
We estimate cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day period beginning on the mailing date for the proxy statement containing the antitakeover amendment proposal. We use the mailing date for the proxy statement as the announcement date since no earlier public announcements are found in the Wall Street Journal Index for any of the sample firms. This is the same announcement date used by DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and McWilliams (1990) .
DeAngelo and Rice report that over 95 percent of antitakeover amendment proposals are approved and McWilliams reports that most rejected antitakeover amendments are stockholder initiated.
To the extent that the market places a high probability on the likelihood that a proposal will be adopted, we expect that most of the stock price reaction to information contained in the proposal announcement will occur when the proposal is made public. Therefore, we also use the proxy mailing date as the event date because all of the amendments in our sample are proposed by management. Further, we find no evidence that any of the antitakeover amendments in our sample are subsequently defeated.
The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using standard event study methodology described in detail by Brown and Warner (1985) . Unless otherwise noted, the market model parameters are estimated over the 200 days from day -230 to day -31 using the CRSP equally weighted index. For the entire sample, the mean and median abnormal returns for the two-day event window are 0.055 percent and -0.258 percent, respectively (see Panel A of Table 2 ). Consistent with DeAngelo and Rice (1983), Bhagat and Jefferies (1991) , and Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) , neither is significantly different from zero in two-tailed tests. The z-statistic for a test that the mean differs from zero is 0.910 (p-value of 0.363) and the p-value for the sign-rank test that the median differs from zero is 0.180. The stock price reaction is positive in 136 cases and negative in 158 cases.
In Panel B of Table 2 , we report abnormal return distributions for sub-samples in which unaffiliated blockholders dominate affiliated blockholders (Row 2), neither blockholder class dominates the other (Row 3), and affiliated blockholders dominate unaffiliated blockholders (Row 4). If unaffiliated blockholders are perceived by the market to be more effective monitors of managerial decisions than affiliated blockholders, then we would expect abnormal returns around antitakeover amendment proposal announcements to be more positive where unaffiliated blockholders are dominant.
Rows 2 and 4 in Table 2 In Panels C and D of Table 2 , we classify one class of blockholders as dominating the other if the total holdings of that class exceed that of the other class by at least 5 percent and 10 percent, respectively. We focus on these differences to highlight those firms in which one class of blockholders is likely to have a significant advantage in influencing management decisions. 8 The evidence in Panels C and D is consistent with that found in Panel B. The mean and median abnormal returns differ between Rows 7 and 9 and between Rows 12 and 14. Furthermore, the differences in the means are both significant at the 2 percent level whereas the differences in the medians in Panels C and D are significant at the 5 percent level and the 2 percent level, respectively.
We next compare affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings at firms where a positive abnormal return is observed with those at firms where a negative abnormal return is observed. Consistent with the evidence in Table 2 , the data in Table 3 To further investigate whether shareholders perceive antitakeover amendment proposals positively or negatively based on the relative holdings of affiliated and unaffiliated blockholders, we also report differences in holdings of affiliated and unaffiliated blockholders by the sign of the abnormal return in Table 3 . The figures reported in the last row of The evidence in Tables 2 and 3 suggests that the abnormal returns observed around the antitakeover amendment announcements are related to the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings. Furthermore, to the extent that management is unlikely to propose an amendment that does not have a high probability of being adopted, this evidence is consistent with the idea that affiliated blockholders are perceived by the market as more likely to support value-destroying amendments than unaffiliated blockholders.
Next, we investigate the differences in blockholdings at firms with positive and negative abnormal returns by examining, for the positive and negative return sub-samples, the number of firms in which each class of blockholders is dominant. Table 4 We also collected information on the nature of the relationships between commercial banks and amendment proposing firms in which they are blockholders. We focused on commercial banks in this analysis because they are the largest affiliated blockholder class and because more information is available in proxy statements on their relationships with the proposing firms than is available for the other types of affiliated blockholders. This analysis reveals that commercial bank blockholders are trustees for the amendment proposing firm's stock purchase plan, profit sharing plan, and/or retirement plan in at least 16 of the 49 observations where a commercial bank blockholder is present. Shares in these plans represent an average of 81.9 percent of the total shares beneficially held by the 13 (of 16) banks for which specific data are available. Moreover, three of the 16 banks that are trustees for the firm are also trustees for officers and directors, and an additional 14 banks are trustees to officers and directors only. The quantity of shares involved in trustee relationships with officers and directors are also substantial, representing 48.84 percent of the total shares beneficially held by the 15 (of 17) banks for which these data are available. Overall, at least 30 commercial bank blockholders have important trustee relationships with the amendment-proposing firms. The incentives provided by these relationships, along with the prospect of additional commercial and investment banking business relationships is likely to provide these banks with incentives to act in ways that are not consistent with share value maximization.
B. Multivariate Evidence
To isolate the stock price reaction associated with differences in the monitoring incentives of affiliated and unaffiliated outside blockholders, we estimate ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable in these regressions is the two-day abnormal return beginning on the day that the proxy is mailed. The explanatory variables include measures of affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings. Our control variables include the number of antitakeover amendments proposed, a measure of firm performance relative to that of the control firm, a measure of growth opportunities at the amendment-proposing firm relative to that at the control firm, CEO equity ownership, insider blockholdings, the percentage of independent outside directors on the board, and the natural log of assets (to control for the extent that firm size acts as a takeover deterrent). Firm performance is measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to the book value of assets less the corresponding ratio for the matched control firm in the fiscal year immediately preceding the proxy mailing date. We proxy for relative growth opportunities using a dummy variable that equals one if the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets for the antitakeover amendment proposing firm exceeds that ratio for the matched control firm, and zero otherwise.
We report coefficient estimates for these regressions in Table 5 . Regression 1 shows the relation between abnormal returns and the percentage of shares held by all outside blockholders.
Consistent with Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) , the coefficient estimate for the total outside blockholdings variable is positive, but insignificant.
Total outside blockholdings are partitioned into affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings in It is worth noting that the economic significance of the coefficient on the blockholder difference variable is almost twice as large, and the statistical significance is similar, when Regressions 3 through 5 are estimated with the 12-day abnormal return (over the period from day -10 through +1) as the dependent variable. The magnitudes of the coefficient estimates from these regressions indicate that each 10 percentage point difference between affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings is associated with a 1.13 to 1.14 percentage point decrease in the 12-day abnormal return. To this point we have not explicitly considered the influence of atomistic (e.g., small and diffuse) shareholders on the decision to propose an antitakeover amendment. If we assume that atomistic shareholders tend to vote with management, and define non-blockholders as atomistic shareholders, then it is possible that when management is deciding whether to propose an amendment, it is the absence of unaffiliated blockholders rather than the presence of affiliated blockholders that is of principal concern. To examine how abnormal returns vary with the presence or absence of unaffiliated blockholders, we estimate Regression 7 in Table 5 with two dummy variables. The first of these dummy variables equals one if the firm has at least one affiliated blockholder, and zero otherwise. The second equals one if the firm has no unaffiliated blockholder, and zero otherwise.
The coefficient estimate for the first dummy variable is negative, and marginally significant.
The coefficient estimate for the second dummy variable is also negative, but does not differ significantly from zero. These results are consistent with the notion that both the lack of an unaffiliated blockholder and the presence of an affiliated blockholder have a negative affect on monitoring efficiency.
C. Robustness Tests
To ensure that the evidence we report is not an artifact of the event window we use, we examine abnormal returns for a variety of event windows around the proxy mailing date. In this analysis we examine abnormal returns over the following periods relative to the proxy mailing date: day . 10 The results from this analysis are presented in Table 6 .
The magnitude of the difference in abnormal returns between firms dominated by unaffiliated blockholders and firms dominated by affiliated blockholders for event windows of day -10 through day +1 and day -5 through day +1 is generally consistent with the results reported in Table 2 . Furthermore, differences in mean and median cumulative abnormal returns for these event widows are significant at the 5 percent level in Panels A, B and C of Table 6 . It is worth noting that as the difference in blockholdings increases, so does the difference in the cumulative abnormal returns. This is particularly evident in Panel C of Table 6 , where regardless of the window examined, the difference in mean and median cumulative abnormal returns is significant at conventional levels.
Although not reported in a table, we also examine additional abnormal return windows in a multivariate framework. Specifically, we re-estimate Regressions 3 through 5 in Table 5 using the abnormal return windows discussed above as the dependent variables. For CAR [-10 ,+1], CAR [-5,+1] and CAR [-3 ,+1], we find that the coefficient estimates for the difference in affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings are negative and significant at either the 1 percent or 5 percent level in all cases. These results are consistent with those reported in Table 5 where the abnormal returns are estimated for the shorter event window of [0,+1].
To further examine the robustness of the evidence from the Regressions in Table 5 , we reestimated each model excluding the four abnormal return observations that are more than three standard deviations from the mean value for the entire sample. We also re-estimated the regression models with holdings of all independent outside directors classified as unaffiliated blockholdings. We further examined the impact of alternative control variables on the regression evidence, including the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets (net of the corresponding ratio for the control firm), the actual ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets, and a variable to indicate whether the proxy reports the firm's intention to issue new common stock. None of these variations in the regression models have a material effect on either the magnitudes or significance levels of the outside blockholder coefficient estimates.
Beyond the above robustness checks, we also examined the sensitivity of the results to model choice. For example, we estimated logit models in which the dependent variable equals one if the abnormal return is positive, and zero otherwise and in which the explanatory variables are the same as those in Regressions 3 through 5 in Table 5 . The evidence from these models is consistent with those reported for the ordinary least squares regressions. In all cases, the coefficient estimate for the difference between affiliated and unaffiliated blockholdings is negative and statistically significant.
We interpret the regression evidence as consistent with the idea that affiliated blockholders are less effective as monitors than unaffiliated blockholders. One potential problem with this interpretation is that this argument does not necessarily imply a significant negative relation between abnormal returns and stock holdings by affiliated blockholders for all levels of ownership. The benefits of siding with management may not be related to ownership whereas the wealth loss from a decrease in the value of the shares held by a blockholder increases with ownership. Consequently, a larger ownership position might be expected to reduce the incentives of an affiliated blockholder to side with management, especially for investment banks and insurance companies.
We examined a number of alternative specifications for the regression models to investigate whether the incentives of affiliated blockholders vary with the size of the blocks that they control. For example, we estimated piecewise linear regressions in which the coefficient for the affiliated blockholdings is allowed to vary. We examined differences in the coefficients for this variable for affiliated blockholders with ownership positions of less than 10 percent, 15 percent, and 20 percent and for blockholders with ownership positions greater than each of these break points. The coefficient estimates from these regressions are uniformly negative for affiliated blockholders with holdings less than and greater than these ownership positions.
The evidence from the piecewise regressions appears to contradict the cost-benefit argument above. However, this evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with this argument since many of the affiliated blockholders may not bear a proportionate fraction of the wealth loss attributable to a decline in the value of a firm's shares. The most common affiliated blockholders are either commercial banks or ESOPs that generally act as representatives of small diffuse stockholders. Commercial banks and ESOPs tend to control large blocks relative to the insurance firms or investment banks that are more likely to bear the full cost associated with a decline in stock price. The median holdings of commercial banks, ESOPs, insurance companies, and investment banks are 10.5 percent, 11.8 percent, 6.7 percent, and 6.2 percent respectively. Furthermore, eighteen banks and eleven ESOPs control blocks that are larger than the largest block held by an insurance company (13.1 percent) or investment bank (7.0 percent). It is possible that the stockholders whose interests are represented by banks and ESOPs place little pressure on those institutions to exercise the voting power of their shares to advance their interests.
V. Conclusions
Relatively little is known about differences in the monitoring incentives of large stockholders.
We report new evidence that the incentives of large outside stockholders (blockholders) to monitor managers are perceived to vary with their relationships with the firm. Following Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) , blockholders are classified according to whether they have potential business relationships with the firm or not. We examine the relation between the stock price reaction to the proposal of fair price, supermajority, classified board and blank check preferred stock amendments and the percentage holdings of the firm's affiliated and unaffiliated blockholders to investigate differences in the market's perception of the monitoring incentives of these two classes of blockholders.
The evidence we report suggests that affiliated blockholders are viewed by the market as Data are for a sample of 294 observations in which at least one antitakeover charter amendment is proposed in a firm's annual proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. Outside blockholders are investors who control at least 5 percent of the common stock of the firm and who are not officers or directors or relatives of the officers or directors. Affiliated outside blockholders are outside blockholders who have potential business relationships with the firm. Affiliated blockholders include commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, or employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). All other outside blockholders are classified as unaffiliated. The percentage of CEO equity holdings is the proportion of the firm's common stock held by the highest paid executive officer of the firm holding the title of CEO, chairman of the board, or president. Independent outside directors are directors who are not current or former employees of the firm or relatives of current employees, or who are not currently employed at an accounting firm, commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company, law firm, or consulting firm. EBIT/Book Assets is the ratio of EBIT to beginning of period book assets less the industry average of that ratio. Market Value Assets/Book Value Assets is the ratio of the sum of the market value of equity and the book liabilities to the book value of assets. A control firm is identified for each amendment-proposing firm based on size and industry. Stock price reactions to antitakeover amendment proposals for a sample of 294 observations in which at least one antitakeover charter amendment is proposed in a firm's annual proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. Abnormal returns are cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day period beginning on the date on which the proxy containing the antitakeover amendment proposal is mailed. Market model parameters are estimated for days -230 through -31, relative to the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equally weighted index. Outside blockholders are investors who control at least 5 percent of the common stock of the firm and who are not officers or directors or relatives of the officers or directors. Affiliated outside blockholders are outside blockholders who have potential business relationships with the firm. Affiliated outside blockholders include commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, or employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). All other outside blockholders are classified as unaffiliated. The 136 observations in Row 3 firms include 134 firms with no blockholder and two firms with equal unaffiliated and affiliated holdings. Tests that the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns equal zero are computed using standardized abnormal returns. P-values are reported in parentheses for two-tailed tests. Outside blockholdings for a sample of 294 observations in which at least one antitakeover charter amendment is proposed in a firm's annual proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. Outside blockholders are investors who control at least 5 percent of the common stock of the firm and who are not officers or directors or relatives of the officers or directors. Affiliated outside blockholders are outside blockholders who have potential business relationships with the firm. Affiliated blockholders include commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, or employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). All other outside blockholders are classified as unaffiliated. Abnormal returns are cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day period beginning on the date which the proxy containing the antitakeover amendment proposal is mailed. Market model parameters are estimated for days -230 through -31, relative to the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equally weighted index. T-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics are reported for tests of the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the mean and median percentage of blockholdings for those firms with positive CARs around the proxy mailing date and for those firms with negative CARs. Outside blockholdings for a sample of 294 observations in which at least one antitakeover charter amendment is proposed in a firm's annual proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. Outside blockholders are investors who control at least 5 percent of the common stock of the firm and who are not officers or directors or relatives of the officers or directors. Affiliated outside blockholders are outside blockholders who have potential business relationships with the firm. Affiliated blockholders include commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, or employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). All other outside blockholders are classified as unaffiliated. Abnormal returns are cumulative abnormal returns for the two-day period beginning on the date which the proxy containing the antitakeover amendment proposal is mailed. Market model parameters are estimated for days -230 through -31, relative to the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equally weighted index. Data are for a sample of 294 observations in which at least one antitakeover charter amendment is proposed in a firm's annual proxy statement between January 1979 and December 2001. The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the two-day period beginning on the date that the proxy containing the amendment proposal is mailed. Market model parameters for the abnormal return calculations are estimated over days -230 through -31, relative to the proxy mailing date, using the CRSP equally weighted index. Outside blockholders are investors who control at least 5 percent of the common stock of the firm and who are not officers or directors or relatives of the officers or directors. Affiliated outside blockholders are outside blockholders who have potential business relationships with the firm. Affiliated blockholders include commercial or investment banks, insurance companies, or employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). All other outside blockholders are classified as unaffiliated. Independent Outside directors are directors who are not current or former employees of the firm or relatives of current employees, or who are not currently employed at an accounting firm, commercial bank, investment bank, insurance company, law firm, or consulting firm. EBIT is earnings before interest and taxes. A control firm is identified for each amendment-proposing firm based on size and industry. P-values for two-tailed tests that the coefficient estimates equal zero are in parentheses. 
